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Abstract
Skill-biased technical change and trade integration have both been indicated to be the cause
of the wide increase in wage inequality in U.S. in the last 50 years. This paper shows in a simple
unied framework why both mechanisms can reproduce the observed pattern of wage dispersion.
Intra-rm rent distribution can be used to disentangle these causes.
1 Introduction
A number of studies have shown that wage inequality in the United States has been increasing throughout
the last 40 or 50 years. The ratio of wages at the 50th vs. 10th percentile, and 90th vs. 50th percentile in
the distribution, grew each approximately 10% from 1973 to 1987. After that, the lower tail attened,
while the upper tail continued to grow 10% more through 2004 (Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005),
(2006)). At extreme high values in the wage distribution, inequality started increasing in the sixties,
and grew even more markedly (Piketty and Saez (2003), (2004))1.
While there seems to be a consensus that an increase in demand biased toward skilled workers is
at the origin of these facts and that that much of the increase in inequality has been observed within
sectors (see for example Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)), the
causes of this increase are the subject of an intense controversy.
Department of Economics, Ph.D. program, The University of Chicago. Contact: fmonte@uchicago.edu. The rst
version of this work was discussed in February 2004 as undergraduate dissertation at Bocconi University, Italy, under the
title "Commercio Internazionale, Eterogeneitae Diseguaglianze nella Distribuzione del Reddito". I am deeply indebted
toward Paolo Epifani and Fabrizio Onida for their guidance on that work. A longer version of this paper has circulated
at various times in the past years under the title "Two Sided Heterogeneity, Technology and Trade". Thomas Chaney,
James Heckman, Samuel Kortum and Ralph Ossa provided patient guidance, insightful critiques and careful comments
and suggestions on this project. This paper has greatly beneted from discussions with Pierre AndreChiappori, Jonathan
Eaton, Lance Lochner, Lars Nesheim, Jaromir Nosal, Nancy Stokey and participants at the working groups on Capital
Theory and International Trade and the University of Chicago. All errors are my own.
1For example, from 1960 to 2004 the ratio between the wage at the 99th and the 95th percentile changed from 1.6 to 2;
in the same period, the ratio 99.9-99 increased from 1.7 to 2.2, and the ratio 99.99-99.9 increased from 2.1 to 4.4. Looking
at the overall wage distribution, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) document a 72% increase in the variance of log-weekly
wages for males between 1963 and 1989, showing how the change in log real wages is essentially a linear function of the
percentile in the wage distribution.
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Skill-biased technical change and trade integration are the two most prominent candidates for an
explanation2. In particular, under the assumption that trade shifts the derived demand of skilled workers
across sectors, Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) argue that
this pattern is only consistent with skill-biased technical change. This position is also supported by the
fact that the increase in relative demand of skilled workers has been larger where computing technology
has spread faster (Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003))3. On the other
hand, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) nd a signicant role for international trade when they consider
the import content of rmsintermediate inputs: a shift in demand away from unskilled and toward
skilled workers within sectors occurs when rms respond to competition from low-wage countries by
outsourcing abroad tasks intensive in unskilled labor.
The common denominator of this debate is that trade ows are mainly driven by di¤erences in the
price of skilled vs. unskilled workers across countries (i.e., on Hecksher-Ohlin motives). Although this
channel has gained relevance in recent years with the rise of China and other developing countries (see the
discussion in Krugman (2008)), intra-industry trade has been very important since long before (Baldwin
and Martin (1999)). It is therefore surprising that a relative evaluation of the consequences of skill-biased
technical change vs. intra-industry trade have not received much attention in the literature. This paper
wants to contribute to ll this gap by asking two questions: 1) Can skill-biased technical change and trade
integration produce the same observed pattern for inequality within a unied framework? And if so, 2)
Can rm-level data help to disentangle the two causes? The answer to these questions are yes, and yes:
by examining the equilibrium, micro-level responses of the wage function in a heterogeneous population
of workers and rms, I show that the evolution of wage ratios described above can be rationalized
independently by both the forces considered, and show what evidence needs to be provided to tell apart
the two mechanisms. The neatness of the results is obtained at the price of strong reliance on functional
form assumptions, which is admittedly in no way general, although often standard. However, it will be
a virtue of the model the ability to clearly answer the questions posed.
To frame my argument, I consider two identical economies with a potentially unbounded mass
of goods, where varieties are characterized by heterogeneous e¢ ciencies in their technology, in the
spirit of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). I extend this framework by assuming that
workers are heterogeneous in their ability to run any rm (if they choose so), while they are identical
as production workers at the rmsproduction lines: a rm is then made up by an idea, a manager,
and production workers. Complementarities between technology and ability4 imply positive assortative
matching between managers and technological e¢ ciency5, producing a "superstars" e¤ect as in Rosen
2These are by no means the only two causes put forth. Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) consider the consequences
of shifts in labor force compositions in terms of education and experience. Card and Di Nardo (2002) provide a general
critique of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis.
3In particular, computers are argued to be substitute for unskilled and complementary to skilled workers: hence,
rates of computer adoption should be correlated with rates of skill-upgrading across industries. Empirically, rates of
skill-upgrading within industries explain most of the increase in demand of college workers.
4Log-supermodularity, in the terms of Costinot (2009))
5Sattinger (1979) is the rst to propose this framework. This paper generalizes his contribution, introducing a fully-
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(1981). The occupational choice implies that the wage of the manager if she was a production worker
plays the role of the xed selling cost in the domestic market, giving rise to increasing returns to scale
at the rm level (as in Krugman (1979)). A xed cost of exporting produces the endogenous selection
of most productive rms in the foreign market.
To answer the rst question of this paper, I build the theoretical counterpart of wage ratios at two
(arbitrary) levels of the skill spectrum and examine how this ratio moves following exogenous changes in
the two relevant forces in the economy. Predictions on the response of wage ratios can always be reduced
to predictions of local changes in inequality. The local change in inequality describes how the wage ratio
moves for two abilities similar enough, s0 and s00 > s0. The wage of s00 is simply the wage of s0 plus
the marginal price of skills: hence, the direction of the change in this wage ratio can be determined by
comparing two elasticities, the elasticity of the total price of skills (i.e., the wage of s0) and the elasticity
of the marginal price of skills (i.e., the slope of the wage at s0). Suppose now that the latter is more
responsive than the former: then, an exogenous shock that raises both the total and the marginal price
of skills increases the ratio between the two wages and increases local inequality.
I model skill-biased technical change as an increase in the contribution of ideas to rm-level pro-
ductivity. While all rms tend to gain from this increase, complementarities in production ensure that
better managers gain more than proportionately relative to average managers; on the other hand, the
improvement in the overall e¢ ciency of the economy exerts a stronger competitive pressure uniformly
on all rms. With power law distributions for ideas and abilities, the marginal price of skills is always
more responsive than the total price of skills. For low levels of abilities, they both decrease, but the
former falls more, and local inequality decreases; for high levels of abilities, they are both larger, but
the former raises more, and local inequality increases.
Trade integration in the form of reduction of iceberg transport costs also benets rms asymmetri-
cally: while the domestic sellers must bear sti¤er competition from abroad, exporters face lower costs
to sell their products in the foreign market. This argument is standard in all trade models with hetero-
geneous rms. I show that the marginal price of skills is again more sensitive, and the same behavior
of local changes in inequality is produced. In both cases, the level of wage is less sensitive than the
marginal wage because part of the adjustment on the level is borne by prots.
I can then answer positively to the rst question because the wage ratio between two arbitrary levels
of ability can always be expressed as the sum of all the local changes between them. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the rst paper which can reproduce the basic facts identied in the rm-level
heterogeneity and trade literature, and provide a link between the empirically observed evolution of
wage ratios and a general equilibrium theory of the consequences of skill-biased technical change and
intra-industry trade.
If skill-biased technical change and trade integration can both rationalize the pattern for inequality
in the U.S. economy that the literature has documented, what can help tell the two causes apart? I focus
edged general equilibrium model where the outside options are endogenously determined. Sattinger (1993) gives a review
and a motivation for using assingment models to study wage distributions.
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on the intra-rm rent distribution, where I call "rent" the sum of prots and the managers wage, less the
opportunity cost of ideas and managers in the alternative occupation (zero and the production worker
wage, respectively). This is the rst paper to make a connection between intra-rm rent distribution, and
the consequences of intra-industry trade and skill-biased technical change. I show that the intra-rm rent
distribution is not modied by trade integration, which only a¤ects competitiveness and productivities
across rms. In equilibrium, in fact, the slope of the wage function (a marginal cost for the rm) must
reect the marginal benet of a better manager. In comparing two similar rms, then, the fraction
of the marginal rent captured by the better manager must be proportional to her contribution to the
creation of that rent. Since the trade costs inuence the marginal contribution of managers and ideas
in the same way, their relative contribution cannot be a function of trade integration. Hence, changes
in inequality not accompanied by change in the intra-rm rent distribution must be attributed to trade.
Vice-versa, changes in the intra-rm rent distribution must imply changes in local inequality caused by
skill-biased technical change.
This paper is consistent with the patterns identied in the empirical literature on trade and rm-level
heterogeneity: exporting rms are larger, more productive, and earn higher prots; moreover, I add to
the current literature a channel through which larger rms also pay higher wages (Oi and Idson (1999)),
exporting rms employ higher quality of workers and pay higher wages than rms only selling on the
domestic market (see for example Bernard and Jensen, (1995), (1997), (1999)).
The hypotheses of the model allow the arguments in this paper to dodge the most common rejection
of trade-based explanations for the evolution of inequality. I analyze a progressive reduction of variable
trasportation costs between two perfectly identical economies, because contemporary trade ows are
mainly based on intra-industry trade between similar countries and on similar products6. This focus
shuts down by construction motives for international trade based on relative di¤erences in factor endow-
ments (as in the classic Heckscher-Ohlin framework) and the associated distributional e¤ects based on
di¤erences in relative factor intensities across goods (Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects)7. Since trade ows are
not generated by comparative advantage, rejections grounded on the reallocation of employment shares
across sectors (Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998)) do not apply to
this framework.
The model is consistent with the mechanisms used by Gabaix and Landier (2008) to describe the
surge in CEO compensation in the last decades: this framework endogenizes the response of the size
distribution of rms to di¤erent exogenous shocks. Also, it shows that a divergent behavior in the
upper and lower tails of the wage distribution can be produced even when changes in the labor force
composition (Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005)) are absent. The elasticity of total and marginal prices
6For example, Baldwin and Martin (1999) document that two-thirds of contemporary world trade occurs among
rich countries with similar factor endowments, and three-fourths of this share is two-way trade within narrowly dened
industries. See also Helpman (1999), for a discussion. The rise in the share of trade in manufactured goods with developing
countries is not to be ignored, but is too recent to account for the evolution of inequality starting the sixties. Moreover,
an Hecksher-Ohlin-based explanation would predict a reduction in the skill premium in China, which is counterfactual.
7A similar approach is undertaken in Epifani and Gancia (2008), who consider the case of two goods with di¤erent
skill intensity, homogeneous rms and no choice between skilled and unskilled occupations.
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of skills are all that matter, and when one considers only data on the wage distribution, these e¤ects
are di¢ cult to disentangle.
This paper belongs to a series of recent studies which capitalize on rm-level heterogeneity models
(Manasse and Turrini (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2005), Yeaple (2005), Chaney (2008)) and extend them enriching the details of the human capital
aspects.
The closest paper to this study is Costinot and Vogel (2009), who build a model of complementar-
ities in production capable of addressing the consequences of technological change, North-North and
North-South trade on the wage function of heterogeneous workers. Their analysis has less restrictive
hypotheses, and allows for skill- and task-upgrading and downgrading, i.e., changes in the assignment
function between workers and tasks: in the present paper, this possibility is shut down by the power
law assumptions on the ideas and abilitiesdistribution. However, their model is still an Hecksher-Ohlin
model, and there is no motive for trade between two identical countries. Moreover, the mass of goods
(in their model, tasks) is xed and there is no notion of selection into the home market. This result is
driven - compared to the present study - by the absence of an occupational choice of workers between
production and managerial activities: as a consequence, skill-biased technical change cannot then pro-
duce a divergent pattern for wage ratios in di¤erent regions of the ability spectrum. Finally, their model
does not capture the well-documented selection of subsets of rms into the export market, and only
compares autarky and free-trade equilibria when North-North trade is driven by di¤erences in factor
diversity8 across countries.
This paper is also related to Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008). Their paper focuses on the
relation between trade, search and screening costs, and unemployment. Contrary to this model, it
features rms with many heterogeneous workers. However, the consequences of skill-biased technical
change are not addressed. Moreover, heterogeneity in wages arises because labor market frictions give
workers a bargaining power within the rm, while in this paper it is simply a consequence of assortative
matching and of demand and supply at each skill level.
Also related to this study is Verhoogen (2008), who proposes a partial equilibrium framework where
wage inequality among heterogeneous workers in developing countries increases following trade integra-
tion: the reason is that an increase in the demand for product quality raises the demand of more skilled
workers because of complementarities between input quality and output quality. This mechanism limits
its usefulness in discussing trade among identical countries.
I see the present study as complementary to this literature in the endevour to better understand how
international trade generates interdependence across labor market outcomes of di¤erent countries.
In the rest of the paper, I will describe the model in closed economy (section 2) and provide a
motivation for the theoretical framework used in analyzing wage ratios, applying this to skill-biased
technical change (section 3). In section 4, I extend the model to an open economy framework, while in
section 5 I show how wage ratios respond to skill-biased techical change and trade integration. Section 6
8Factor diversity captures the relative abundance of agents with extreme abilities, be them very low or very high.
5
argues why the intra-rm rent distribution can help in disentangling the two causes, skill-biased technical
change and trade integration. Section 7 provides some conclusive remarks.
2 The Closed Economy
2.1 Consumers, Managers, and Ideas
The representative consumer maximizes a standard CES utility function where, from an innite mass
of varieties potentially available, a subset J of them is produced and aggregated as
Y =
Z
j2J
y (j)( 1)= dj
=( 1)
with   1: Standard optimization implies that each consumer will spend
x (j) =

p (j)
P
1 
X (2.1)
on each variety produced, where
P =
Z
j2J
p (j)1  dj
1=(1 )
is the ideal price index of good Y and X is total consumersexpenditure on it.
To x ideas, we think of di¤erent j as di¤erent varieties; however, I will interchangeably use the term
"rm", implicitly assuming one product per rm.
Three inputs are necessary for a production line to exists: an idea, a manager, and production
workers in proportion to output.
Varieties di¤er according to the status of the technology available for their production: denoting
with z 2 (0;1) the quality of an idea, I assume that there is a measure G (z) = Tz z (with z  1) of
ideas at least as good as z. This specication insures that there is a su¢ cient number of ideas, however
bad, to accomodate any number of managers in equilibrium. Ideas are owned by a mutual fund that
maximizes prots and redistributes them equally across agents9.
The economy is populated by a mass L of agents, which, as in Lucas (1978), can be either production
workers or managers. Agents are heterogeneous in their mangerial ability, while they all have a unit
e¢ ciency as production workers. The ability s is also distributed according to a power law: for s  1,
there is a measure L (s) = Ls s (s  1) of potential managers with ability of at least s. While in
Lucas (1978) potential managers di¤er by their ability to run larger rms producing a homogeneous nal
product, here I assume that there are complementarities between managerial ability and idea e¢ ciency.
In particular, if production with an idea of e¢ ciency z is run by a manager s, the total rms productivity
9The assumption of equal redistribution is immaterial to the rest of the paper, since I am only interested in wage
(rather than income) distribution. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) discuss relative merits of these two alternatives.
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is
' (z; s) = zs
with  > 0,  > 0.10 Note that by suitably redening units and parameters in the productivity, we
can always write the distribution of ability as having a shape parameter of 1, and still recover the same
distribution for s, which is what matters for the productivity of the rm; the same is true for the
parameter z on the distribution of idease¢ ciency. The parameters s and z will then be set to 1
without loss of generality11. The parameter  uniquely measures the inuence of managersability:
while  = 0 reduces this model to a simple one-sided heterogeneity framework, increasing  lets a rm
gain from a better manager. Moreover, there is a simple mapping between abilities and percentiles in
the skill and wage distributions: the ability s is always collocated at the 100(1  s 1)th percentile.
Agents who choose to be production workers earn a wage w, which is then also the opportunity cost
of being a manager. This wage is the numeraire and will be normalized to 1; I leave it here explicitly for
clarity. When y units of good are to be produced, y=' e¢ ciency units of work from production workers
are used at a cost of wy=' in total. Denote as:
v (p;') = x (p)  wx (p)
p'
the surplus of the rm with overall productivity ', i.e. the excess of revenues over costs for production
workers, when the price p is chosen. For any manager s, a rm with idea quality z sets a price which
solves
 (z; s)  max
p
v (p;' (z; s))
implying
p (') =

   1
w
'
) p (z; s) = 
   1
w
zs
(2.2)
For any given quality z, the optimal price is then a function of the quality of the manager s the
owner of z chooses. The way in which the market balances incentives across rms is the subject of the
next section.
10This assumption satises log-supermodularity as in Costinot (2007).
11More precisely, suppose that G (z) = Tz z ; in this case, the distribution of z satises T Pr fz > ag = Ta z=.
We want to show that there are a ~z and ~ such that the measure of ideas ~z better than any value a is Ta 1 and
that still assigns to ~z~ the same distribution that z has. Let ~z  zz , and ~ = =z. Hence, the measure of ideas
~z better than a is T Pr f~z > ag = T Przz > a	 = Ta 1: ~z has a distribution with shape parameter 1. Moreover,
T Pr

~z~ > a
	
= T Pr

~z > az=
	
= T
 
az=
 1
which is then equal to the distribution of z. An analogous argument,
with ~s  ss and ~ = =s, establishes the equivalence for the population of managers. Finally, since z and s have
the same distribution as ~z~ and ~s~, it must also be true that the product of these two variables, ~z~~s~, has the same
distribution as zs.
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2.2 Assignment
Substituting the revenue function (2.1) and the optimal price (2.2) in the expression for v (p;'), the
surplus for a rm (z; s) is rewritten as
v (z; s) = M

zs
w
 1
(2.3)
M  1



   1
1 
XP  1
The termM is a measure of the economically relevant size of the market. A larger expenditure level X,
or weaker competition through higher average price P all make the market bigger and tend to raise the
surplus for any rm.
This surplus must cover payments to the manager of ability s, residually determining prots for
the idea z. The complementarity between managers and ideas - which drives the incentive to positive
assortative matching - is manifest in the cross derivative of the surplus v1;2 (z; s) being positive: a
marginal increase in the quality of ideas always enhances the total net value of production, but this
enhancement is larger when the manager running the rm is better. This complementarity creates an
incentive for better rms to hire better managers, or equivalently, for more able managers to choose
better rms. The assignment between managers and rms is non-random. The ideasowner problem is
then
 (z) = max
s2[1;1)
fv (z; s)  w (s)g
Following Sattinger (1979), I assume that a rm is unable to a¤ect the prevailing market conditions,
so that the wage function is taken as given: the optimal ability s will be chosen to balance the marginal
benet of a better manager (higher productivity and larger surplus available for distribution) with the
marginal costs of it (higher wage demanded). In an optimum,
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s) = w0 (s) (2.4)
gives a condition that can be used to trace out the wage function when the left hand side is evaluated
at the idea quality z which chooses s optimally, i.e., at z = z (s).
To build the equilibrium wage function, I will then proceed under the tentative assumption of positive
assortative matching, z0 (s) > 0, and prove that this must be true in equilibrium because of comple-
mentarities in production. If the best managers work running rms with the best ideas, the assignment
problem will imply (matching the measures at the right tail of the distributions) that Tz 1 = Ls 1, or
z = ts, s = z=t, with t  T=L (2.5)
under our assumptions. The parameter t, which we take as exogenous, is a measure of relative size of
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technology available in the country. A larger population size increases the availability of managers at
all levels of ability, so that any idea z is matched with a better s; any potential manager gets hurt by a
larger L, though, since this increases the mass of people better than her12.
Di¤erentiating then the surplus (2.3) with respect to s, plugging z (s) from (2.5) in it, and substituting
the resulting v2 (z (s) ; s) in (2.4) we obtain
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s)  (   1)M

t
w
 1
s(+)( 1) 1 = w0 (s)
This equation gives the equilibrium marginal rent for managers of di¤erent ability: its elasticity to
di¤erent stimuli will play a crucial role in determining how inequality responds. Integrating over s, and
using the fact that the marginal manager - denote her sc - must be indi¤erent between occupations, we
get:
w (s) =
Z s
sc
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s) ds =
=

+ 

t
w
 1
M
 
s(+)( 1)   s(+)( 1)c

+ w (2.6)
and with w (s) = w below sc.
The prot function  (z) must then be the di¤erence between the surplus and the wage, and leaves
the marginal idea zc indi¤erent to the alternative of not being used. To nd the equilibrium prot value,
I use the optimal assignment function (2.5) and (2.6), and the fact that marginal idea zc must have zero
prots, to get
 (z) = v (z; s (z))  w (s (z)) =
=

+ 

t 
w
 1
M
 
z(+)( 1)   z(+)( 1)c

(2.7)
with  (z) = 0 below zc13.
The su¢ cient condition for an optimum will require, when looking at the choice of manager z, that
v22 (z; s) w00 (s) < 0 when z = z (s) (i.e., along the optimal assignment), which can be easily shown to
be true by di¤erentiating (2.4) again with respect to s, and then plugging in the assignment function:
the complementarity assumption v12 (z; s (z)) > 0 insures that positive assortative matching emerges as
an equilibrium outcome14.
12To parallel the terminology of Costinot and Vogel (2008), this would be skill-upgrading from the standpoint of the
rm, and rm-downgrading (which they call task-downgrading) from the point of view of a manager.
13This is not the only way to characterize the earning functions. Since the problem is symmetric in managers and ideas,
we could have started with the managers taking as given the prot function  (z) and choosing ideas. Alternatively, we
could have had each side choosing the other (as Sattinger (1979)), particularizing each constant of integration with the
relevant outside option.
14The second order condition for the optimality of s in the rm problem requires v22 (z; s) w00 (s) < 0. Di¤erentiating
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The equilibrium assignment of managers to rms provides a simple microfoundation for the rent
sharing between managers and ideas within a rm, based on local scarcity of talents vs. ideasand their
contributions to the total productivity of the rm. The rent to be shared is v (s ; z (s))  w, the excess
of surplus over the sum of managers and ideasopportunity cost ( w and 0 respectively). The share of
this rent going to managerswages is
  
+ 
If managers do not inuence the rms e¢ ciency ( = 0), the rent for talent is zero, the equilibrium
wage function reduces to the outside option, and we are back to the standard one-sided heterogeneity
case similar to Melitz (2003), where workerscontributions are homogeneous and the wage per e¢ ciency
unit is at across ability levels. On the other hand, if  = 0 we recover a model similar to Lucas (1978)
and Manasse and Turrini (2001), where heterogeneous workers are operating using homogeneous ideas:
prots then are zero, and only a non-trivial wage function remains.
If complementarities exist in production, the distribution of each factor determines both the rent-
sharing and the nal productivity distribution of rms; in other words, making assumptions on both
the productivity distribution of rms and rent sharing is equivalent to making a statement on the
degree of heterogeneity of each factor. Observationally, this framework provides a link between rm size
distribution and the share of rent which goes to each factor type.
For some purposes, one could go further, simply assuming a rm-level heterogeneity in ' and an
ad-hoc rent splitting in constant shares. Such an approach would sidestep the description of the market
mechanism underlying the assignment problem, at the cost of obscuring its economic content. For
the purpose of this study, however, we cannot simply assume an exogenous rm-level productivity
distribution and arbitrary rent-sharing proportions. As I will argue below, a proper way to think about
skill-biased technical change is to keep xed the distribution of managersability, while changing the
e¤ective distribution of idea quality through increases in . When this happens, not only does the share
of rents to managers decrease, but the overall rm productivity distribution improves: studying the
e¤ect of a change in the share parameter we would miss the second part, while only studying an increase
in the rm-level heterogeneity parameter we would ignore the former.
2.3 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium in a closed economy, it is su¢ cient to determine the cuto¤ sc for man-
agersability and the expenditure levelX in the economy. Note rst that using the price index denition,
(2.4) again with respect to s we get w00 (s) = v22 (z; s) + v12 (z; s) z0 (s), which implies w00 (z)  v22 (z; s) = v12 (z; s) z0 (s).
Using (2.3), we have
v12 (z; s) =
1



   1
1 
XP 1 (   1) (   1) z( 1) 1s( 1) 1 > 0
so that, v22 (z; s)  w00 (s) < 0 , v12 (z; s) z0 (s) > 0, s0 (z) > 0.
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the individual rm price (2.2) and the assignment function (2.5), and assuming (+ ) (   1) < 1, the
price index has the form
P =

   1 w

 
L
1=( 1)
t s =( 1)c (2.8)
with
  1  (   1) (+ ) 2 (0; 1) (2.9)
where the assumption (+ ) (   1) < 1 is needed to insure that the joint knowledge embodied in ideas
and people never implies the existence of a few rms e¢ cient enough to bring down the price index P
to zero. Note that a larger relative measure of technology t reduces the price of the nal good aggregate
Y .
The expenditure on production workers for each rm is x (')   v (') ; using the expression for
revenues (2.1), surplus (2.3), the assignment function (2.5) and the price index (2.8), and integrating
over all active rms, we get that the overall expenditure on production workers is  1

X:
On the supply side, when sc is the managerscuto¤, L (1  s 1c ) e¢ ciency units are provided for
production. Equating total wages of production workers to total expenditure over them by rms, we get
X =

   1L w
 
1  s 1c

(2.10)
This curve describes an equilibrium relation in the labor market. When sc ! 1, total earnings of
production workers are zero, and so must be the expenditureX, while as sc !1, all agents are employed
as production workers, and total expenditure on them approaches a nite constant; the monotonic
increase in sc is inherited by the properties of the CDF.
In addition to production labor market clearing, we need to make sure that the rm (sc; z (sc)) is
made up by factors indi¤erent between production of varieties in Y and their alternative employment.
This condition requires the surplus function (2.3) to be equal to the sum of the outside options for the
indi¤erent pair of agents; using the assignment relation (2.5) and the price index (2.8),
X =

 
L ws 1c (2.11)
This equation is a "zero cuto¤ earnings" condition. As sc ! 1 the right-hand side becomes a strictly
positive and nite number, while as sc grows toward innity, this curve goes to zero. Hence, as shown
in Figure 2.1, the equilibrium (sc; X) is always uniquely determined.
The simple functional form assumed allows to solve explicitly for sc in terms of parameters: equating
(2.10) and (2.11), and using the denition (2.9) for  , we have
sc = 1 +
(   1)
1  (   1) (+ ) (2.12)
X =

 +    1L (2.13)
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Xcs
Zero Cutoff Earnings
Labor Market Equilibrium
Figure 2.1: This gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ sc and the expenditure level X in
closed economy. The labor market equilibrium represents the locus of pairs (sc; X) where expenditure over
and income of production workers are equalized; the zero cuto¤ earnings is the locus of points where the
surplus of the marginal rm (sc; z (sc)) exactly covers the sum of outside options, so that there is no incentive
for entry or exit in the di¤erentiated sector.
where we note that the equilibrium cuto¤ is only a function of the sum of contributions of ideas and
managers.
Having established the equilibrium conditions, we can also rewrite the earning functions in more
explicit terms. Using the assignment function (2.5) to express the surplus (2.3) in terms of s, and
imposing equality to w for the marginal rm, we have that
M = wt ( 1)s (+)( 1)c = w
t( 1)z (+)( 1)c
Substituting the LHS out in the expressions for wages (2.6) and prots (2.7), we can rewrite them as
w (s) = 
"
s
sc
(+)( 1)
  1
#
w + w (2.14)
 (z) = (1  )
"
z
zc
(+)( 1)
  1
#
w (2.15)
Using the expression for sc in (2.12) in the price index (2.8), we can express the prot and wage function
above the cuto¤ in real terms only as a function of parameters, as  (z) =P and w (s) =P above the
cuto¤s, and 0 and P 1 below, respectively.
The equilibrium wage function is then determined jointly by the distribution of abilities and tech-
nology through a market mechanism which prices the relative scarcity of each type of agent.
The structure of the real earning functions has some characteristic elements.
The inverse of the price index gives a measure of the opportunity cost of keeping agents employed
as production workers: in fact, their real wage is exactly P 1, after normalizing w to 1.
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The parameter  represents a talent-specic component: total real rents in the rm
h
(s=sc)
1    1
i
=P
are split giving a share  to managers and a share 1    to ideas. For example, if  = 0, managers do
not contribute to the overall productivity distribution, and the share of rents going to managers is zero,
and the wage reduces to w for all abilities.
A microeconomic component, s=sc and z=zc, determines then income di¤erences between di¤erent
levels of ability within managers, and within ideas.
In the next section, I use this framework to evaluate the consequences of skill-biased technical change
on the wage ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the wage distribution.
3 Skill-Biased Technical Change
This section analyzes the e¤ect of skill-biased technical change on an arbitrary wage ratio in a closed
economy. Before focusing on the substantive side of the issue, I provide a general motivation for the
theoretical framework used in analyzing the e¤ect of skill-biased technical change on wage ratios. This
discussion will also apply to the analysis of the open economy.
I will model skill-biased technical change as an exogenous increase in . For a given ability s, the
elasticity of the productivity of the rm ts(+) to  is simply  ln ts, which is increasing in s: the
percent change in productivity is biased toward rms which employ better managers15. This argument
makes clear why we need a market mechanism and two distributions of heterogeneous agents, rather
than an exogenous rent splitting between them: we think of skill-biased technical change as a¤ecting
a xed ability distribution, which implies both an improvement in the assignment and a change in the
overall distribution of productivities.
Empirically, the skill-biased technical change hypothesis is rooted in a positive correlation between
adoption of computer-based technologies, skill-upgrading, and rising wage premia for education within
and across rms and industries (see Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) for a discussion and further refer-
ences, and Card and DiNardo (2002) for a critique). This hypothesis has also been rationalized arguing
that it impacts asymmetrically routine and non-routine tasks, thereby providing testable implications
on the composition and shifts of job tasks over time (Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)). My formulation
captures these arguments in a simple model.
Since the distribution of abilities is xed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between any ability
level s and a percentile in the wage distribution, 100(1   s 1). The analysis can then focus on the
elasticity to  of w (s00) =w (s0), with s00 > s0. Consider rst two agents with very similar levels of ability.
The di¤erence in their wage is essentially the marginal price of skills at s0, so that the wage ratio is just
1 + ws (s
0) =w (s0). When the marginal price of skills is more elastic to  than is the wage, skill-biased
technical change increases the premium for the ability di¤erence ws (s0) proportionally more than the
15For example, at t =  = 1 a 1% increase in  raises the productivity of a rm employing a top 10% manager by 1.61
percentage points more than the median rm (in fact, ln (s00=s0) = ln (10=2) = 1:61).
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price of ability w (s0) (i.e., the wage at s0). The wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0), which in this case is a measure
of local inequality, increases.
More generally, the change in the wage ratio between two ability levels s0 and s00 can always be
thought of as the "sum" of all the local changes intervening between them. The formal argument
(relegated to Appendix A.1) shows that the local change in inequality at s when  changes is
() (s)  ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
(3.1)
where w (s) = @w (s) =@ and ws (s) = @2w (s) = (@@s). The function () (s) is the di¤erence between
the elasticity of the marginal price of skills and the elasticity of the total price of skills. For two ability
levels s0 and s00, with s00 > s0, the elasticity of the wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0) to  is simplyZ s00
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s) ds
The total change in inequality between s0 and s00 is the integral of the local changes in inequality,
weighted by ws (s) =w (s), a positive and unitless measure of the importance of ability di¤erences. When
for some s, () (s) > 0, the local contribution of s is to increase all the wage ratios that contain it, and
vice-versa.
Any argument about the behavior of wage dispersion is essentially a specication of eq. (3.1); the
framework here proposed simply provides one. I now examine in detail how skill-biased technical change
a¤ects () (s).
3.1 Skill-Biased Technical Change and Wage Ratios
At the economy-wide level, skill-biased technical change raises the contribution of ideas to the produc-
tivity of all rms. However, any rm, holding constant its productivity, faces now a sti¤er competition
for its product. If sc is the indi¤erent manager at expenditure level Xc, eq. (2.11) shows that a larger
expenditure is necessary for her to stay in the managerial occupation: the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings curve
in Figure 2.1 shifts up. Since the market for production workers is not directly a¤ected by this change,
selection is stricter among managers: the worst white collar managers become blue collar.
Having described how  a¤ects exit from the di¤erentiated sector, I can characterize the behavior of
the local change in inequality.
The elasticity of the wage to  (the second term in (3.1)) is determined by the interaction of three
e¤ects. Eq. (2.14) shows that an increase in  a¤ects the wage through (1) the change in the share of
rents  going to managers, (2) the e¤ect of selection, and (3) the e¤ect of assignment16. The rst term
captures a negative "share" e¤ect: for a xed rent level in the rm, the share of it going to managers
16The e¤ect of  on the opportunity cost, which goes through real wages, is canceled because we are considering wage
ratios, so that [w (s00) =P ] = [w (s0) =P ] = w (s00) =w (s0).
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decreases, because technology now contributes more overall to di¤erences in rm-level productivities.
The second term captures a negative "selection" e¤ect: since the rent level is just the integral of the
marginal rents from the worst rm upwards, when the worst agent select out of the market (we already
saw that @sc=@ > 0) the total rent decreases. The third term represents an "assignment" e¤ect, and is
always positive: any manager gains from a larger contribution of z to the productivity of the rm; since
the change is biased towards better agents, the assignment will grow in importance as s grows.
The elasticity to  of the marginal price of skill ws (s) (the rst term in (3.1)), on the other hand, is
not directly inuenced by the share of rents going to managers, since  is a¤ecting in the same proportion
both ws (s) and its change when  increases: the share e¤ect is absent. However, skill-biased technical
change tends to reduce the elasticity to  of the marginal price of skills through selection, and to increase
it through assignment. Simple calculations show that () (s) is positive if and only if
ws (s)
ws (s)
>
w (s)
w (s)
,
 (1   )
sc
@sc
@| {z }
Selection
+ (   1) ln s
sc| {z }
Assignment
>  g1 (s) (1  )| {z }
Share
  g2 (s) (1   )
sc
@sc
@| {z }
Selection
+ g2 (s) (   1) ln s
sc| {z }
Assignment
where
g1 (s)  w (s)  1
w (s)
2 (0; 1) , g2 (s)  w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
2 (; 1) (3.2)
and g0i (s) > 0 for i = 1; 2.
For managers bad enough, the assignment and share e¤ects are negligible, and the negative selection
e¤ect dominates. Its impact is greater (more negative) on the marginal price of skills: the selection
e¤ect determines the wage elasticity only to the extent managers participate to the creation of surplus
(in fact, g2 (s) ! 0 as  ! 0). Overall, the marginal price of skills falls proportionately more than the
wage, so that the wage ratio between two close managers becomes smaller: the change in local inequality
is negative.
For good enough managers, the assignment e¤ects dominates the other two, but again, only a fraction
g2 (s) of it impacts the elasticity of the wage. Hence, for abilities high enough, skill-biased technical
change increases the marginal price of skills proportionately more than the wage: for two close managers
the ratio of wages will then increase, and the contribution of local inequality will be positive.
Note also that if the selection e¤ect is close to zero, the region with negative local change in inequality
tends to vanish, which means that selection is necessary for the inequality to decrease among bad
managers.
Proposition 1 (proven in Appendix A.2) formally states this result:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique skill level s() > sc such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s) 
0, s  s().
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With these results in hand, it is possible to rationalize a divergent pattern in the percentile ratio for
high vs. low ability agents (as in Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005) and an increasing dispersion in the
tails (as in Piketty and Saez 2004) only in terms of skill-biased technical change. The latter is already
evident: local inequality increases for all s > s(), and the percentile ratio will increase at any pair of
points in the ability distribution above the threshold, and in particular, at very high percentiles in the
tail. To rationalize the former, it is su¢ cient to note that we can pick s0 < s00 < sc, and s000 > s() to
produce a constant ratio in the lower part of the income distribution (w (s00) =w (s0)) and an increasing
ratio in the upper part (w (s000) =w (s00)); or, sc < s0 < s00 < s() in the lower part and s000 > s() to obtain
one decreasing and one increasing wage ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the distribution.
4 The Open Economy
I now introduce the framework and show the equilibrium determination when 2 identical countries are
allowed to trade with each other. Assuming identical countries is appropriate since we want to think
of intra-industry trade as a source of inequality, and to do so it is necessary to neutralize di¤erences in
factor endowments or technologies.
In what follows, I lay out the main modication to the framework in an open economy; then I show
how the equilibrium is determined.
4.1 Framework
I assume that a rm needs to produce  units of a good for 1 unit to reach the foreign destination, and
that f units of production workers are needed to sell in the export market. If the price of rm ' is p (')
in the domestic market, it will be p (') abroad. The surplus from sales on the domestic and export
markets are given respectively by:
vd (z; s) = M

zs
w
 1
(4.1)
vx (z; s) = 
1 M

zs
w
 1
  f w (4.2)
where vi, with i = d; x; indicates the surplus reaped by a rm selling in the domestic and in the export
market, respectively, and M  1

 

 1
1 
XP  1.
The earning functions corresponding to equations (2.6) and (2.7) are built following steps analogous to
the closed economy. The only di¤erence is that the optimality condition (2.4) will depend on the export
status of the rm. Since this is not known in advance, I postulate the existence of the two cuto¤s sd
and sx, and then build separately two sets of rst order conditions, for rms selling only to the domestic
market (which earn vd (z; s)) and for rms selling to both markets (which earn vd (z; s) + vx (z; s)).
Having obtained two expressions for wd (s) and wx (s), I impose two separate indi¤erence conditions,
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wd (sd) = w and wx (sx) = f w, to actually pin down sd and sx.
Following these steps, simple calculations deliver the earning functions in each country:
 (z) =
8<: (1  )

t 
w
 1
M

z1    z1  d

z 2 [zd; zx)
(1  )

t 
w
 1
M
h
z1    z1  d

+  1 
 
z1    z1  x
i
z  zx
(4.3)
w (s) =
8<: 
 
t
w
 1
M

s1    s1  d

+ w s 2 [sd; sx)

 
t
w
 1
M
h
s1    s1  d

+  1 
 
s1    s1  x
i
+ w s  sx
(4.4)
To connect the selection of domestic and foreign sellers, I set the surplus in (4.1) and (4.2) to w
and 0, respectively, to characterize sd and sx; substituting the assignment function (2.5), solving both
expressions for M and equating them,
sx =
 
 1f
1=(1  )
sd (4.5)
where I assume that ( 1f)1=(1  ) > 1 in order to generate the empirically relevant pattern of parti-
tioning in the export behavior of rms, i.e., sx > sd.
This equation allows us to write the price index as a simple function of the domestic cuto¤. In fact,
since
P =

   1 
1=( 1)
h
Lt( 1) w1 s  d + 
1 Lt( 1) w1 s  x
i1=(1 )
we can use (4.5) to eliminate s  x and get:
P =

   1 w

 
L
1=( 1)
t 

1 +
1

 1=( 1)
s
 =( 1)
d (4.6)
   1=(+)f =(1  ) (4.7)
where  is an index of distance between the two economies. While the general structure of the price
index reects its shape in closed economy (eq. (2.8)), the additional term (1 + 1=) 1=( 1) shows how
competition from abroad lowers the price index at home. In particular, note that heterogeneity in both
skill and technology contribute to e¤ectively reduce the distance between the two countries (as  + 
grows,  becomes smaller). The relative size of ideas vs. population t lowers the price index only in
proportion to the importance of the assignment: as ! 0, ideas play no role in the productivity, sorting
is immaterial, and t no longer a¤ects P .
4.2 Equilibrium
In an open economy, equilibrium will require for each country: (i) indi¤erence for the marginal agent sd
between alternative occupation, (ii) equilibrium in the market for production workers, and (iii) trade
balance.
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The indi¤erence of a rm to sell on the domestic market or shut down (condition (i)) simply requires
the surplus in the domestic market given in (4.1) to be equal to the sum of the outside options w and
0 when evaluated at sd and zd  tsd: Substituting in such equality the expression for the price index
(4.6), using (4.5) and rearranging, we get
X =

 
L w

1 +
1


s 1d (4.8)
This equation is the open economy equivalent of (2.11), the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings: it shows how compe-
tition from abroad a¤ects occupational choices. Stronger trade integration (lower ) makes competition
sti¤er, lowering the price index and increasing the real wage for production workers: at any expenditure
level X, the cuto¤ agent sd must be better to compete in her own market.
Equating total income of production workers to total expenditure of rms on them (condition (ii))
we obtain
L w
 
1  s 1d

=
   1

X + f wLs 1x (4.9)
The right-hand side of this expression is found integrating separately labor demand for domestic and
export sales, and including the xed requirement to sell abroad, f w, in proportion to the mass of
exporters Ls 1x . Substituting (4.5) into (4.9) and rearranging,
X =

   1L w

1 

1 +
1


s 1d

(4.10)
Equation (4.10) is the parallel in an open economy of eq. (2.10), the Labor Market Clearing condition:
it shows how the possibility to sell abroad a¤ects domestic demand of production workers. As economies
become more integrated, more workers are demanded to pay the xed costs of export ( decreases), and
a lower level of overall expenditure X is needed to equilibrate demand and supply of production workers.
To close the model, we need to make sure that these conditions are compatible in the world economy:
if trade balance has to be satised (condition (iii)), this entails a relation between the relative wage of
production workers in the two economies. When countries are identical, this ratio is simply 1.
Equations (4.8) and (4.10) pin down the 2 endogenous variables of this model, the national income
X and the domestic cuto¤s sd: The exporter cuto¤ sx can then be found using (4.5), and the price
indicex using (4.6). Equating (4.8) and (4.10) and solving for sd, we obtain
sd =

1 +
   1
1  (   1) (+ )

1 +
1


(4.11)
Substituting this value back in (4.8), I obtain
X =

 +    1L w (4.12)
Figure 4.1 shows graphically how the equilibrium is determined.
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 X
ds
Zero Cutoff Earnings
Labor Market Equilibrium
Closed Economy
Open Economy
Figure 4.1: This gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ sd and the expenditure level X
in an open economy. The possibility to sell abroad implies that a lower level of expenditure (for any supply
of production workers) is su¢ cient for equilibrium, so that the Labor Market Equilibrium curve shifts down
and to the right. On the other hand, competition from abroad implies that the marginal rm must employ a
better manager (at any level of domestic expenditure) to stay indi¤erent when trade is allowed, and the Zero
Cuto¤ Earnings curve shifts up and to the right. As a result, the cuto¤ for domestic producers is larger in
open economy.
In equilibrium, the market size M can be written, using the assignment function (2.5) in the surplus
(4.1) and imposing equality to w, as
M = wt ( 1)s (+)( 1)d = w
t( 1)z (+)( 1)d
We can use this expression and the equation (4.5) to substitute out M and the exporterscuto¤s in
the prot and wage functions (4.3) and (4.4), to obtain
 (z) =
8>><>>:
(1  )

z
zd
1  
  1

z 2 [zd; zx)
(1  )

(1 +  1 )

z
zd
1  
  (1 + f)

z  zx
(4.13)
and
w (s) =
8>><>>:


s
sd
1  
  1

+ 1 s 2 [sd; sx)


(1 +  1 )

s
sd
1  
  (1 + f)

+ 1 s  sd
(4.14)
The real earnings can easily be obtained dividing by the price index (4.6). Below the cuto¤s, we still
have  (z) =P = 0 and w (s) =P = P 1.
All the components identied in the closed economy case are present, suitably modied, in the open
economy. The macro-economic component, P 1, and the type-specic component  enter in a similar
way. The existence of an export market now raises the marginal price of skills for managers good enough
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to access it.
In the next section, I use this model to compare the consequences of skill-biased technical change
and trade integration on wages ratios in di¤erent regions of the income distribution.
5 Implications for Wage Dispersion
As discussed in the Introduction, the recent evolution of the wage distribution can be characterized by a
divergent pattern for wage ratios in the lower vs. the upper tail, and an increase in the dispersion on the
right tail of the wage distribution. I now ask if, for given contribution of managers  to the productivity
of the rm, trade integration and skill-biased technical change can both rationalize this pattern.
5.1 Skill-Biased Technical Change and Inequality
The basic components determining the direction of the local change in inequality (see eq. (3.1)) are
unaltered when countries are allowed to trade: we still have to compare the elasticity of the marginal
price of skill to the elasticity of the wage with respect to a change in . The di¤erence lies in the latter
term, which varies according to the export status. In particular, denoting gi2 (s) the weight on selection
and assignment e¤ects for domestic sellers (i = d) and exporters (i = x), the local change in inequality
is positive if and only if
 (1   )
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
+ (   1) ln s
sd| {z }
Assignment
>   g1 (s) (1  )| {z }
Share
  gi2 (s)
(1   )
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
+ gi2 (s) (   1) ln
s
sd| {z }
Assignment
where
gd2 (s) 
w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
, for s 2 (sd; sx) (5.1)
gx2 (s) 
w (s)  [1   (1 + f)]
w (s)
; for s  sx (5.2)
and g1 (s)  (w (s)  1) =w (s), as in (3.2). The analysis of each of these terms exactly mirrors the
discussion in the closed economy section.
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills (left-hand side) is una¤ected by the export status.
Conditional on exporting (i = x), the elasticity of the wage to  (right-hand side) now incorporates the
additional xed cost necessary to sell abroad. A larger xed cost tends to reduce the level of skill rent
(see eq. (4.14)) and hence to increase the percentage impact of any given change in  on w (s). For
this reason, the selection and assignment e¤ects receive a larger weight for exporters than for domestic
sellers, i.e., gx2 (s) > g
d
2 (sx) 8s  sx. The share e¤ect, operating on a given rent, is not changed.
Note that while gd2 (s) 2 (; 1) always, xed costs can be large enough (i.e., 1   (1 + f) < 0, which
is true if and only if f > =) to imply gx2 (s) > 1. In this case, the selection and the assignment e¤ect
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are stronger on the elasticity of the wage to  (right-hand side) than on the elasticity of the marginal
price of skills (left-hand side). In order to answer the question of this paper, whether or not the observed
behavior on wage ratios can be rationalized both by skill-biased technical change and trade integration,
it is su¢ cient to focus on the case in which gx2 (s) < 1. I will maintain this restriction throughout the
rest of the paper, although I will briey discuss what happens when it is not satised17.
Assumption 1. Fixed costs of exporting are such that f < =.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique skill level s() > sd such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s) 
0, s  s().
This proposition (proven in Appendix A.3) generalizes Proposition 1 to an open economy. Whether
the threshold s() is larger or smaller than the threshold for exporters sx depends on the values of the
parameters of the model. In the Proof, I show that along a path of trade integration (from  ! 1
to  ! 1) it is possible to have a positive local change in inequality 1) for all exporters and the best
domestic sellers ( s() 2 (sd; sx)), 2) only for all exporters (s() = sx)18, and nally 3) only for the best
exporters (s() > sx).
When Assumption 1 is not satised (f < =), the assignment and selection e¤ects are proportionally
more important on the level of the wage than on the marginal wage. In this case, it is still true that for
the worst domestic sellers local inequality decreases, while it increases for the best exporters. However,
it is possible to show that the threshold is no longer necessarily unique: we can have two ability levels
s(;d) and s(;x), for domestic sellers and exporters respectively, above which local inequality increases,
and below which it decreases. This is a case where (1) the best domestic sellers are good enough for the
assignment e¤ect to overcome the other two: as  increases, the the total price of skills is less sensitive
than the marginal price, and the local change in inequality is positive; and (2) at the same time, for
some of the worst exporters xed costs are high enough to make the total price of skills more sensitive
to  than the marginal price: for them the local change in inequality is negative19.
5.2 Trade Integration and Inequality
In this section I adapt the conceptual framework introduced above to evaluate the e¤ect of trade inte-
gration on the evolution of wage ratios. In this experiment, I will model trade integration as reduction
17At aggregate level, Assumption 1 is placing a lower bound on the ratio between rents to ideas and rent to managers.
Total rents for managers (wages less opportunity costs) can be written as W = 	  Ls 1d , and prots (i.e., ideasrents)
as  = 	  L (1  ) s 1d , where 	  	h +	f are two parameter aggregates coming from home and foreing market rents;
in particular, 	h = [1=   1], and 	f =
 
1 + 1 

=   (1 + f) 1 =f   1f  =(1  ). Hence, =W = =.
18In particular, there is a non-trivial interval of values for  where this state occurs: in other words, s() = sx is not a
knife-edge case (see Proof of Proposition 2).
19Since a complete taxonomy of the cases is not the objective of this paper, and divergent patterns of percentile ratios
can be obtained even if f < =, I will focus on cases where this restriction holds. Also, note that even if f > =, we
think of falling trade costs and skill-biased technical change as important facts in the major industrialized countries in
recent decades. Hence, this inequality would tend to be reversed by declines in f and increases in .
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in the proportional transportation cost  . Following steps analogous to what we did before to analyze
episodes of skill-biased technical change (as in Appendix A.1), we can then write the total change in
inequality following trade integration between ability s0 and s00 > s0 as
() (s) =
ws (s) 
ws (s)
  w (s) 
w (s)
where () (s) measures the local change in inequality at ability level s, w (s) = @w (s) =@ and ws (s) =
@2w (s) = (@@s). The local change in inequality is then proportional to the di¤erence between the
elasticity to  of the marginal price of skills and the total price of skills. The change in the wage ratio
between s0 and s00, which can be written asZ s00
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s) ds
is positive when trade costs fall if @
@
[w (s00) =w (s0)] < 0, so that now () (s) < 0 goes in the direction
of increasing local inequality.
Trade integration is a¤ecting wages through two channels, (1) the reduced marginal cost that ex-
porters face in order to sell abroad, and (2) higher competition at home, which tends to reduce revenues
on the domestic market and select some managers out of the di¤erentiated sector.
For non-exporters, the selection e¤ect is the only channel active when trade integration occurs. Using
(4.14), simple calculations show that
ws (s) 
ws (s)

s<sx
>
w (s) 
w (s)

s<sx
,
 (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
>  gd2 (s) (1   )

sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
, () (s) > 0
with gd2 given in (5.1). As  falls, both the wage and the marginal price of skill decrease. However, the
marginal price is more responsive (it drops more), since the elasticity of the wage level is reduced by
the fact that managers are not getting all the surplus (and in fact, gd2 (s) < 1): part of the adjustment
will occur through prots. Hence, as trade integration occurs, () (s) is positive, and local inequality
decreases for all non-exporting managers.
For exporters, di¤erentiation of (4.14) delivers
ws (s) 
ws (s)

ssx
<
w (s) 
w (s)

ssx
,
  (   1)
 1 + 1| {z }
Price
  (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
<   (s=sd)
1  
w (s)
(   1)
 1| {z }
Price
  gx2 (s) (1   )

sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
, () (s) < 0
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where gx2 is given in (5.2). The price e¤ect increases the marginal price of skills (on the left hand side)
and the component of the wage coming from the export market (on the right hand side). The former
always receives a higher weight, since part of the adjustment on the rent level goes through prots. This
force points towards an increase in local inequality.
Under Assumption 1, the selection e¤ect is always pushing ws(s)
ws(s)
upward, in positive territory (recall
that @sd=@ < 0), and more than
w (s)
w(s)
: as it happens for domestic sellers, trade integration lowers the
price index, puts an upward pressure on real wages of production workers and makes the selection in
the manager occupation stricter. This is a force towards the reduction of local inequality.
Overall, the price e¤ect always prevails, and trade integration increases local inequality for exporters.
We can then state the following proposition (proven in Appendix A.4), which states that the unique
threshold ability beyond which trade increases local inequality coincides with the exporterscuto¤ability,
sx.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique skill level s() = sx such that the local change in inequality is
positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s)  0, s  s().
Under Assumption 1, trade integration is producing increasing dispersion of the wages in the high
part of the wage distribution and a compression of wages in the lower part. Evaluating the evolution
of wage dispersion in di¤erent regions of the wage distribution is then not su¢ cient to disentangle the
source of the pattern.
If f > =, Assumption 1 is not satised, local inequality decreases for both non-exporters and
exporters (see proof of Proposition 3), and that the qualitative consequences of skill-biased technical
change and trade integration no longer coincide. In this case, the selection e¤ect on w (s)
w(s)
is receiving
a weight so high that the total price of skills is always more sensitive than the marginal price of skills,
and local inequality decreases at all levels with trade integration.
Assumption 1 is then crucial for trade to imply the same qualitative behavior of skill-biased technical
change and its validity is ultimately an empirical question. Note that along a path of skill-biased
technical change (increase in ), this assumption tends to be more and more restricitive. In absence
of any information on its validity, we cannot exclude that trade has a role in causing the observed
pattern of wage dispersion only on the basis of the wage distribution in the overall economy. I argue
in the discussion which follows that intra-rm rent distribution can provide an alternative source of
information which does not rely on Assumption 1.
6 Intra-Firm Rent Distribution
A larger wage dispersion at the top and smaller wage dispersion at the bottom of the distribution can be
caused both by skill-biased technical change and by trade integration, so that information only on the
wage distribution is not enough. The following question naturally arises: are there rm-level outcomes
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that have a di¤erent response to these two sources of changes in inequality? And are these responses
independent on the validity of Assumption 1? In this simple framework, the answer is yes to both
questions.
The rent created in a rm by a manager and an idea is given by the sum of prots and managers wage
(i.e., the surplus) less their opportunity cost in the alternative occupation. Noting that the assignment
(2.5) allows us to write z (s) =z (sd) = s=sd, we can use the earning functions (4.13) and (4.14) to express
the rent for an exporting and a non-exporting rm as
 (z (s)) + w (s)  w 
8><>:

s
sd
1  
  1 s 2 [sd; sx)
(1 +  1 )

s
sd
1  
  (1 + f) s  sx
The share of this rent that goes to managers is then
 ()  w (s)  w
 (z (s)) + w (s)  w = 
where   = (+ ); a share 1    () = 1    is then left for prots. This fact is true for any rm,
independently of its export status. Moreover, Assumption 1 may or may not hold, without compromising
the validity of this result.
The intra-rm rent distribution is only a function of the relative contribution of types to the overall
productivity of the rm. In particular, it is not a function of the level of trade integration, not even in
exporting rms. The economic force that drives this result is the positive assortative matching between
managers and ideas: in equilibrium, the wage function equates the marginal benets and costs of a
better manager in all markets where the rm chooses to sell, so that a fraction  of the additional rent
that a larger ability generates in each market is given to the manager. Hence, while trade integration
a¤ects the level of the rents reaped by a rm, it does not a¤ect the way in which this rent is shared.
This suggests that a promising avenue for disentangling the two e¤ects is to look at the intra-rm rent
distribution. Firm-level data on employers and employees, properly interpreted, can give us a handle on
the evolution of . Changes in inequality not accompanied by changes in the intra-rm rent distribution
must be attributed to trade. Vice-versa, changes in the intra-rm rent distribution must imply changes
in local inequality and wage ratios caused by skill-biased technical change.
7 Conclusion
I have shown how changes in local inequality determine the behavior of wage ratios across the ability
spectrum. Although through partially di¤erent channels, local inequality responds in similar ways to
both skill-biased technical change and trade integration: both shocks have asymmetric e¤ects across
rms, raising the competitive pressure on low productivity rms and favoring rms at the high end of
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the productivity range, which are also the rms which employ higher skilled managers. Hence, skill-
biased technical change and trade integration can - under appropriate parameters restriction - both
reproduce divergent patterns of wage ratios in the lower and the upper tail of the wage distribution,
and increasing ratios at all levels in the upper tail, thus being consistent with the evidence on wage
inequality in the last 50 years in the United States.
This result suggests the need to go beyond analyses based on wage distributions that do not consider
also the rms that contribute to determine the level of wage as an equilibrium outcome. I argue that
deeper, rm-level considerations of the mechanisms of operation of each force may help in the quan-
tication of the magnitude of each channel. Since skill-biased technical change operates by increasing
the importance of heterogeneity in technology in the determination of the relative fortune of di¤erent
rms, managers get in each rm a smaller share  of the rent. On the other hand, international trade
inuences the market size and the marginal cost of each rm, while it does not change the intra-rm
rent distribution. Estimates of the evolution of intra-rm rent distribution, possibly based on the use of
employer-employee matched data sets, can put (at least) a bound on the degree of skill-biased technical
change, and help disentangle the size of each channel.
The model is still too highly stilyzed to attempt any reasonable quantication of the magnitude of
the forces that have shaped the evolution of wage ratios in U.S. in the last 50 years. I leave this for
future research.
25
A Proof of Results
A.1 The Local Change in Inequality
For two ability levels s00 > s0, we want to study the direction of the change in w (s00) =w (s0) as  increases.
Denote with w (s) the derivative of the wage function with respect to , and with " (s)  w (s) =w (s)
the point elasticity of the wage. Then, the elasticity of the wage ratio with respect to , call it " (s0; s00),
is simply " (s00)   " (s0). Since the choice of the percentiles (and then the abilities) is arbitrary, it is
convenient to this elasticity as
" (s0; s00) =
Z s00
s0
@" (s)
@s
ds
The elasticity of the wage with respect to  generally varies with the ability level: the function @" (s) =@s
describes this dependence. Moreover, its sign will determine if the local contribution of the ability level
s is to increase or decrease all the wage ratios that contain it. Calculating @"(s)
@s
explicitly,
@" (s)
@s
=
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s)
() (s)  ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
where ws (s) is the marginal wage at s and ws (s) is the cross-partial derivative of the wage function
with respect to  and s: The sign of () (s) is what matters to determine the direction of the local
change in inequality.
A.2 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Closed Economy
Recall that eq. (3.1) denes () (s)  ws(s)
ws(s)
  w(s)
w(s)
:
Di¤erentiating (2.14) with respect to , multiplying by =w (s), and normalizing w to 1, we have
w (s)
w (s)
=
 (   1)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

 j (s)  1
1   + h (s) j (s)

(A.1)
ws (s)
ws (s)
= (   1)h (s) (A.2)
with
j (s) 

s
sc
1  
h (s)  ln s
sc
  (+ ) 1
sc
@sc
@
and where we recall that   = (+ ) and   1   (   1) (+ ). The function j (s) is always
greater than or equal to 1, j0 (s) > 0, and is such that lims!sc j (s) = 1, lims!1 j (s) = +1. The
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function h (s) is always increasing in s and has the properties lims!sc h (s) =   (+ ) 1sc @sc@ < 0, since
the cuto¤ sc is increasing in  (this is immediate from eq. (2.12)), and lims!1 h (s) = +1; hence, h (s)
crosses zero only once.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique skill level s() > sc such that the local change in inequality from
skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s) 
0, s  s().
Proof. For () (s) > 0 is necessary and su¢ cient that ws(s)
ws(s)
  w(s)
w(s)
is positive. Using (A.1) and (A.2)
in this di¤erence and rearranging, we have
() (s)  0, ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
> 0,
(1  )h (s) >   1
1    (j (s)  1)
The left-hand side starts at (1  )h (sc) < 0 and always increases with s, crossing zero only once, while
the right-hand side starts in zero and always decreases with s. Hence, there is one and only one s() such
that () (s)  0 , s  s(). This s() is the unique solution of (1  )h  s() =   1
1  
 
j
 
s()
  1.
Note that if h (sc) were zero, the left- and right-hand side would touch for s = sc and then diverge from
each other, so that we would have s() = sc and no region with a negative local change in inequality.
A.3 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Open Economy
The elasticity of wage to skill is now a piecewise function of the form

w (s)
@w (s)
@
=
(
  (1  ) gd1 (s) + gd2 (s) (   1)h (s) s 2 (sd; sx)
  (1  ) gd1 (s) + gx2 (s) (   1)h (s) s > sx
with
h (s) 

ln
s
sd
  (+ ) 1
sd
@sd
@

gd1 (s) 
w (s)  1
w (s)
;
gd2 (s) 
w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
, gx2 (s) 
w (s)  [1   (1 + f)]
w (s)
However, the elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is always

ws (s)
ws (s) = (   1)h (s)
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Proposition 2 There exists a unique skill level s() > sd such that the local change in inequality from
skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s) 
0, s  s().
Proof. For a domestic seller, s 2 (sd; sx), local inequality increases if and only if

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
,
h (s) >   
1  
1
1   (j (s)  1) (A.3)
In particular, as s! sd, the inequality is never satised: for the worst managers, local inequality always
decreases. For an exporter, s  sx, local inequality increases if and only if

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
,
h (s) >   
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
1 +  1 

j (s)  (1 + f) (A.4)
Note that in both (A.3) and (A.4), (i) the left-hand side is always increasing in s, while (ii) the
right-hand side is always non-positive and decreasing (in (A.4) it is decreasing because, by assumption,
f < = , [1   (1 + f)] > 0): for the values of s where each relation applies, if the inequality is
satised for an s0, it is also satised for all s > s0, and vice-versa, if it is not satised for an s0, it is also
not true for all s < s0. To prove the existence of this threshold and identify the region it falls in, I will
check the value of each inequality at s = sx. Then, let:
lhs ()  h (s) js=sx =
ln f 1=(1  ) 1=(+)
1 + f  =(1  ) 1=(+)
  (+ ) (   1)
2 = 2
1 +  1
 

rhsd ()    
1  
1
1   (j (sx)  1) =  

1  
1
1   
 
f 1   1
rhsx ()    
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
1 +  1 

j (s)  (1 + f) =   
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
f 1   1
These functions describe the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A.3) and (A.4) when s = sx.
Note that rhsd () > rhsx () 8 . The function lhs () can be in three positions with respect to this
inequality.
(i) Suppose that rhsd () > rhsx () > lhs (): at s = sx inequality (A.4) is not satised, and the
local inequality for the worst exporters is decreasing; then, local inequality is also decreasing among the
best domestic sellers, since rhsd () > lhs () : The relation (A.3) is never satised for s 2 [sd; sx), local
inequality is decreasing among all domestic sellers, and there must exists a threshold s() > sx such that
local inequality decreases below it and increases above it.
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(ii) Suppose that lhs () > rhsd () > rhsx () : at s = sx inequality (A.3) is satised, and local
inequality for the best domestic sellers is increasing; then, local inequality is also increasing among all
exporters, i.e., lhs () > rhsx (). The relation (A.4) is always satised for s  sx, local inequality is
then increasing among all exporters, while there must exists a threshold s() 2 (sd; sx) such that local
inequality increases above it and decreases below.
(iii) Suppose that rhsd () > lhs () > rhsx (): at s = sx, (A.3) is not satised while (A.4) is,
and so local inequality increases for all exporters and decreases for all non-exporters. In this cased dd
, s() = sx. Also, since rhsd () > rhsx () holds strictly and lhs () changes continuously with  , this
case is not a knife-edge possibility: it will happen for  2 ( d; x), with  d : rhsd ( d) = lhs ( d) and
x : rhsx (x) = lhs (x).
To show that each of these three cases can actually occur, suppose f = 1. Then, lim!1 lhs () < 0,
lim!1 rhsd () = lim!1 rhsx () = 0. Since, as  !1, lhs () goes monotonically to +1 while both
rhs functions go monotonically to  1 , lhs () will cross once rhsx () and then rhsd () from below.
In this construction, moving  from autarky (+1) to perfect integration ( = 1) will let the economies
visit case (ii), (iii) and nally (i).
A.4 Trade Integration
Recall that, di¤erentiating (4.14) for domestic sellers, and using j (s)  (s=sd)(+)( 1),
w (s) =  (   1) j (s) 1
sd
@sd
@
ws (s) =  (   1) (1   ) s 1j (s) 1
sd
@sd
@
so that the elasticity of wage to  is
w (s)

w (s)
=   (1   ) j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

sd
@sd
@
(A.5)
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is
ws (s)

ws (s)
=
 (   1) (1   ) s 1j (s) 
sd
@sd
@
(1   ) s 1j (s) =   (1   )

sd
@sd
@
(A.6)
For exporters, the relevant functions are:
w (s) =  j (s) (   1)

(+ )
1
sd
@sd
@
 
1 +  1 

+  

ws (s) =   (1   ) s 1j (s) (   1)

(+ )
1
sd
@sd
@
 
1 +  1 

+  

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so that the elasticity of wage to  is
w (s)

w (s)
=
 j (s) (   1)
h
(+ ) 
sd
@sd
@
(1 +  1 ) +  1 
i
 [j (s) (1 +  1 )  (1 + f)] + 1 (A.7)
and the elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is
ws (s)

ws (s)
=
  (   1)
h
(+ ) 
sd
@sd
@
(1 +  1 ) +  1 
i
(1 +  1 )
(A.8)
Also, note that the square bracket is positive, since, di¤erentiating (4.11) and using    1=(+)f =(1  )
(+ )

sd
@sd
@
 
1 +  1 

+  1  =   1
1 + 
 
1 +  1 

+  1  > 0,
(1 + )  1  > 1 +  1  ,   1f =(1  ) > 1
which is always true.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique skill level s() = sx such that the local change in inequality is
positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s)  0, s  s():
Proof. Local inequality increases with trade integration if and only if () (s) < 0.
For domestic sellers, using (A.5) and (A.6), this will happen if and only if
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
,   (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@
<
 (   1) j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

sd
@sd
@
,
1 <
j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1 , 1   < 0
which is never true. Hence, local inequality always decreases for domestic sellers.
For exporters, using (A.7) and (A.8) local inequality increases if
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
,
  (   1)
h
(+ ) 1
sd
@sd
@
(1 +  1 ) +  
i
(1 +  1 )
 <
 j (s) (   1)
h
(+ ) 1
sd
@sd
@
(1 +  1 ) +  
i

 [j (s) (1 +  1 )  (1 + f)] + 1
Since the term in the square bracket is always positive, we can simplify further to obtain
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
, 1
(1 +  1 )
>
j (s)
 [j (s) (1 +  1 )  (1 + f)] + 1
, 1   (1 + f) > 0, f < 

Hence, local inequality increases for exporters as trade barriers fall if and only if f < =:
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